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ABSTRACT: The taxi services market has relied on platforms for many years. Taxis 
can be hailed at the kerb or by using taxi ranks. Often, consumers rely on intermedi-
aries, such as taxi phone lines. The task of these intermediaries is to despatch a call to 
a driver, so that the latter can meet consumers’ demand in each case. Today, the use 
of phone apps reliant on geolocalisation software is among the most common ways in 
which calls are despatched to taxi service providers. Apps come with significant ben-
efits for both parties. Consumers can track the car they reserved, whereas drivers can 
deploy their working time more efficiently since they can locate and respond to calls 
from customers in areas that are within their reach.
The entry into the market for taxi despatch services of these novel instruments has not 
been without consequences, however. Are we witnessing a sea change in the way in 
which traditional platforms in this market have conducted their business so far? What 
are the competition law implications of the entry of phone apps in the taxi despatch 
services’ market? How far is the application of competition rules going to affect the 
nature of taxi despatch platforms? What are the implications of these decisions for the 
functioning of other platform-based markets?
This article analyses this question based on the practice of national authorities who, 
in a number of contexts, have ruled on the legality of taxi platforms. It will be argued 
that the emergence of platform despatchers using geolocalisation technologies may 
not only “disrupt” those business models that have characterised the taxi despatch-
ing market so far. It could also lead to a change in the approach that competition law 
has adopted in relation to other two-sided markets where intermediation is key to the 
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matching of demand and supply, perhaps by spelling the end of “closed” platforms in 
favour of open models of intermediation.
The article will conclude with some more general reflections on the application of EU 
competition rules to two-sided markets. It will be submitted that, due to the focus 
placed on the need to avoid the foreclosure of the market in favour of and by existing 
incumbents, the ability for users to enter and exit from a platform and, more generally, 
to rely on a variety of channels for service intermediation, are going to be essential to 
maintain the openness and competitiveness of these markets.
KEYWORDS: Competition; platforms; taxi services; Italy; national competition 
authorities.
1. Taxi despatch services as a platform industry – even before digital…
1.1.  App- versus phone-based intermediation for taxi services – some 
observations
Taxi services can be provided in a number of ways: taxi drivers can oper-
ate independently and therefore queue at taxi ranks or collect passengers 
at the kerbside. Alternatively, they can rely on call centres that receive 
calls from perspective passengers and then proceed to assign each “job” to 
individual drivers. Taxi despatch services, therefore, are provided through 
platforms and this has been the case for long before Uber. According to, 
among others, Baldwin and Woodard, platforms can be defined as “prod-
ucts, services, firms or institutions that mediate transactions between two 
or more groups of agents”.1 Platform users share the usage of their foun-
dational elements2 with a view to reaching out to potential demand for 
their goods or services. As a result, economies of scale are achieved by 
spreading the costs linked to the functioning of the platform itself across a 
large number of subscribers.3 Economies of scope also emerge since, as the 
platform gains importance, users find it correspondingly easier to come up 
1 Carliss Y. Baldwin and C. Jason Woodard, “The architecture of platforms: A unified 
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with variations of their services and more generally with ways to address 
customer demand more efficiently.4
Platforms provide to their users a valuable “match-making” service, 
designed to decrease search costs and facilitate the meeting of demand 
with supply. As such, there are two sides to a market that relies on a plat-
form. One concerns the relation between platforms and the suppliers of 
a specific good or service – in the taxi services industry, taxi drivers and 
their call despatch service provider of choice. This segment is “business-
to-business”. Platform users, such as drivers, pay a fee for the usage of the 
despatch companies’ services.5 In addition, they often have to commit 
resources with a view to purchasing equipment that is necessary to the 
use of the services offered by the platform. The other segment, instead, 
concerns the relationship between individual consumers – such as, in the 
taxi services market, passengers – and the platform. Perspective buyers 
of goods or services rely on the platform with a view to finding a “suit-
able match” in the form of a supplier of goods or services that can meet 
their economic demands, as “filtered” through the platform itself.6 This 
“business-to-consumer” segment tends to be a no-fee market. Callers to a 
taxi phone line do not pay any fee for the “match-making”, and their costs 
are borne by the services’ providers, by being “internalised” in the fees the 
latter pay to the platform.7
The two market segments outlined above are reciprocally interdepend-
ent: the nature, scope and intensity of these linkages depend on the way in 
which the affiliation relation between platforms and their users is actually 
structured. Thus, for example, “merchants” might decide not to associate 
with a platform that has not attracted interest among their rivals, for the 
perception is that, with limited variety in terms of offer, interest from con-
sumers is also likely to be limited, thus prejudicing the merchants’ ability 
to “drum up” their business through the platform.8 Buyers, on their part, 
4 Ibid.; see also page 11.
5 See e.g. Yixuan Zhong et al., “Achieving stable and optimal passenger-driver match in ride-
sharing systems”, 15th IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad-Hoc and Sensor Systems, 2018, 
https://ieeexplore-ieee-org.ezproxy.is.ed.ac.uk/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=8567549, 125; 
see also page 127.
6 Ibid, 126.
7 See e.g. Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, “Platform competition in two-sided markets”, 
Journal of the European Economic Association 1, no. 4 (2003): 991; see also pages 1012-1013.
8 Andrei Hagiu, “Merchant or two sided platform?”, Review of Network Economics 6, no. 2 
(2007): 116.
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are likely to choose a certain platform by considering “not only the plat-
form’s own characteristics but primarily (…) the goods or services” that 
can be sourced through the platform. Accordingly, it is submitted that the 
more the platform is “populated”, the greater the likelihood that this will 
be appealing to consumers.9 The existence of network effects on both sides 
of this market is a key factor in determining how contestable entry to it is 
for new intermediation services’ providers. If a would-be competitor is not 
able to secure demand among consumers, its platform is unlikely to attract 
interest among service providers. Consumers, on their part, are not going 
to be very keen to rely on a platform that cannot attract a critical number 
of service providers to ensure that their demand is met.10
The nature of the relationship between a platform and its merchant users 
is a central factor to its ability to compete with incumbent intermediaries 
on the consumer side of the market. Platforms could allow merchants to 
rely on a variety of channels of intermediation to identify possible buyers 
beyond the platform itself. Alternatively, they could subject them to an 
obligation to offer their services only through the platform itself.11 A 2013 
study addressed this issue of whether “single-homing” should be preferred 
to “multi-homing” with merchants as a means for platforms to compete 
effectively on the consumer side of the market. It was suggested that secur-
ing “valuable” content (in the eyes of viewers) to the exclusion of rivals 
appeared to confer the platform in question a competitive advantage on 
rivals, since it secured a stable supply of services to the de facto exclusion 
of rivals.12 It was therefore argued that the stipulation of exclusivity clauses 
by platforms and merchants could lead to a competitive bottleneck vis-
à-vis new entrants on the market for the provision of the intermediation 
9 Robin S. Lee, “Vertical integration and exclusivity in platform and two-sided markets”, NET 
Institute Working Paper, 07-39. 2007. https://archive.nyu.edu/bitstream/2451/28519/2/Lee_07-39.
pdf, 6.
10 See inter alia, mutatis mutandis, Catherine E. Tucker, “Digital data, platforms and the usual 
(antitrust) suspects: Network effects, switching costs, essential facilities”, Review of Industrial 
Organization 54 (2019): especially pages 687-688.
11 See mutatis mutandis Decision of 27 June 2018, MyTaxi/Samarcanda/Pronto Taxi/RadioTaxi 
3570, Case I801A, available at: http://www.agcm.it/dotcmsCustom/getDominoAttach?urlStr=19
2.168.14.10:8080/41256297003874BD/0/264D4B0ED3B221FFC12582C6004BBF4E/$File/p27244.
pdf; especially sections 91-94.
12 Carmelo Cennamo and Juan Santalo, “Platform competition: Strategic trade-offs in platform 
markets”, Strategic Management Journal 34, no. 11 (2013): 1332-1333.
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services in question.13 By contrast, the absence of single-homing obliga-
tions, taken together with the dynamic nature of many platform-based 
industries, was regarded as a factor capable of ensuring that competition 
remains very lively on the “business side” of these markets.14 
The nature of the relationship between platforms and consumers is also 
extremely important for their appeal. It has been suggested that platforms 
providing certain services, such as food delivery orders’ fulfilment, tend 
to be mutually inter-changeable in the eyes of consumers, as well as free. 
Thus, it is vital for intermediaries not only to attract as many business users 
as possible, but also to seek to make their own services more “individual”.15 
Competition based on innovation appears to be quite important. The taxi 
despatch intermediation market provides an apt example of how central it 
is for platforms to always provide good-quality and cutting-edge services.16
There are several radical differences between “traditional” providers and 
app-based call despatching companies. From the drivers’ standpoint, tra-
ditional platforms are often “closed”, whereas app-based ones tend to allow 
multi-homing: this was certainly the case for MyTaxi. Taxi apps also have 
a number of appealing features for consumers, which in turn give them a 
competitive advantage over traditional providers. The existence of a lan-
guage barrier, for instance, can affect the ability of end users to rely on a 
“traditional” taxi call centre. By contrast, the circumstance that taxi apps 
have different language versions and even offer a payment service via credit 
cards might contribute to minimise the consequences of not being able 
to speak the local idiom. Geolocation is perhaps the most important fac-
tor that makes online intermediaries strong competitors vis-à-vis phone-
based providers: being able to respectively locate the consumer seeking out 
13 Mark Armstrong and Julian Wright, “Two-sided markets, competitive bottlenecks and exclusive 
contracts”, Economy Theory 32, no. 2 (2007): 373-374. See also Bernard Caillaud and Bruno Jullien, 
“Chicken and egg: Competition among intermediation service providers”, The RAND Journal of 
Economics 34, no. 2 (2003): 310; see also page 320.
14 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, JustEat/HungryHouse merger decision, adopted by the CMA on 16 
November 2017, press release: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-clears-just-eat-hun-
gryhouse-merger; see summary, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a0c673aed915d0 
ade60db7c/justeat-hungryhouse-summary-of-final-report.pdf, 4-5.
15 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, JustEat/HungryHouse, cit. (fn. 14), 3-4.
16 See inter alia Decision of 27 June 2018, MyTaxi/Samarcanda/Pronto Taxi/RadioTaxi 3570, Case 
I801A, paragraphs 84-85; see also, mutatis mutandis, JustEat/HungryHouse, cit. (fn. 14), 3. For 
commentary, see inter alia Kishore Kumar and Ramesh Kumar Namavaram, “A study on factors 
influencing consumers in selection of cab services”, International Journal of Social Science and 
Humanities Research 4, no. 3 (2016): especially page 559.
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a taxi in real time, ascertaining where a driver is, and the related waiting 
times mean reduced search costs (these are equal to zero for consumers).17 
The lower costs that are usually associated with app-based intermediation 
services have also contributed to attract taxi drivers to these new service 
providers. They no longer have to invest in a radio or similar hardware and 
can rely on a smartphone to access call despatching.18
In light of the forgoing analysis, it may be concluded that competition 
among platform intermediaries is shaped by a combination of factors, 
such as the indirect network effects that characterize these markets and 
the likelihood of bottlenecks that can arise, as a result of which the most 
popular platform can soon become an unavoidable business partner. It 
was suggested that, in this context, the nature – whether exclusive or not 
– of the relation between platforms and their users can have a significant 
impact on the ability of rivals to enter and expand on the intermediation 
services markets. Innovation is another important tool for newcomers to 
gain ground, especially among consumers. The next subsection will sum-
marise some of the implications of the entry of geolocalization-based 
intermediaries in the London cab market as an example of the implica-
tions of the entry of these innovative intermediaries.
1.2.  Geolocalization-led intermediaries and London taxis – the impact of 
electronic platforms on traditional call despatchers 
The previous section discussed some of the features of platform based 
markets and showed that due to their two-sided nature, the intensity of 
competition between different platforms depends on the nature of their 
relationship with both merchants and consumers. It was also emphasised 
that, given the strength of the indirect network effects that characterise 
platform based markets, the ability to appeal to a sufficiently large number 
of users on both sides is critical for incumbents as well as, if not more, for 
new entrants. In this context, it was argued that the ability to innovate on 
the consumer side of the market is central to attracting demand toward 
platforms. It was suggested that the market for the provision of taxi des-
patch services is a very good example of these market dynamics.
17 See Katrina M. Wyman, “Taxi regulation in the age of Uber”, New York University Journal of 
Legislation and Public Policy 20, no. 1 (2017): 8-9.
18 Ibid, 14-15. See e.g. Decision of 27 June 2018, MyTaxi/Samarcanda/Pronto Taxi/RadioTaxi 3570, 
Case I801A, paragraph 71. See also, inter alia, Wenbo Zhang et al., “Influencing factors and hetero-
geneity in ridership of traditional and app-based taxi systems”, Transportation 47 (2020): 993-994.
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The purpose of this section is to illustrate the impact of the entry of 
online platforms which rely on geolocalization and on the use of GPS 
trackers that are now present in modern mobile phones in this industry, 
with reference to the London taxi services’ market.19 While the limited 
remit of this article does not allow for an in-depth consideration of the 
features of this specific market, it is worth recalling that the London mar-
ket for taxi fares is rather competitive and well regulated.20 Drivers must 
be licensed to ply their trade: in particular black cab drivers can both pick 
up business at kerbside and via phone lines, i.e. via pre-booking. Essential 
pre-condition for the license is that drivers pass the ‘Knowledge of London’ 
examination.21 However, drivers can still operate without having passed 
this examination, as long as they are licensed to drive “mini-cabs” that can 
be pre-booked, usually through a radio call despatch services’ provider to 
which the driver is affiliated. Black cab drivers can also rely on radio plat-
forms to supplement kerbside calls.22
GPS-based providers started appearing on the London market in the 
early 2000s, thanks to the emergence of modern smartphones. Through 
their central control room, jobs were “automatically assigned by the des-
patch system to the nearest available taxi”.23 In addition, drivers were not 
“locked” in a single provider. They could use the GPS-based provider in 
parallel with traditional radio circuits. They could also continue to pick up 
kerbside passengers, since the system could “detect the meter-on status” 
and therefore “pass up” on a particular taxi.24 This type of service pro-
vision, which entailed, in substance, an open platform, had a number of 
advantages for taxi drivers: it meant lower costs, since the GPS positioning 
relied on the public GPRS signal, required fewer staff in the central room, 
and relied on reduced logistical investment.25 It therefore did away with the 
need to invest in hardware (such as a radio). Perhaps, more importantly, 
geolocation allowed them to manage their workflow more effectively by 
selecting “more local” calls to the area where they found themselves at a 
given time, therefore optimising both time and resources.
19 Walter Skok and Stephen Baird, “Strategic use of emerging technology: The London taxi cab 





24 Ibid, 301. 
25 Ibid, 303.
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App-based, GPS-led call despatch intermediaries came to enjoy a sig-
nificant competitive advantage thanks to the features outlined above, thus 
attracting taxi drivers that had thus far relied on radio-based platforms.26 
They also made entry into the taxi services market a far more appealing 
proposition than if perspective drivers had to rely on traditional channels, 
since they lowered (if not together eliminated) the costs associated with 
becoming a mini-cab driver significantly.27 Thus, by creating a “way in” 
into a highly regulated market that had previously been characterised by 
high initial costs and tangible barriers to entry, GPS-based despatchers 
have come to exert greater pressure on traditional incumbent intermedi-
aries, thereby boosting competition and easing entry in the taxi service 
dispatch market.28
In light of this short excursus into some of the implications of the entry 
of GPS-based call despatch service providers, it is argued that the taxi 
industry is a very apt example of how platform-based markets behave in 
response to the entry of new competitors that rely on innovative methods 
for the provision of services and of the impact that new, more efficient 
entrants can have on the position of incumbents. However, this entry, to 
the extent that it disrupts existing methods of intermediation, has signif-
icant consequences for the functioning of the industry in question. The 
scope of this article does not allow a discussion of the consequences of 
app-based platforms, such as Uber, for the employment status of drivers. 
It concentrates rather on analysing the implications of the arrival of new 
app-based entrants through the lens of competition law. In this context, 
recent case law of the Italian Competition Authority illustrates how the 
entry in the taxi despatch market of app-based intermediaries can affect 
traditional incumbents and, more generally, established ways of managing 
intermediation between taxi drivers and their customers.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid, 304. 
28 Ibid.
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2.  From call centres to apps: changing the business model of call des-
patch services providers?
2.1.  App-based taxi intermediaries: the arrival of Uber on the taxi service 
market—some observations
The previous section outlined the characteristics of a “platform industry” 
and showed how the taxi service market, having traditionally relied on 
platforms as a means of “mediating” supply and demand of these services, 
is a very effective example of the impact of technological innovation on 
existing competition and on the position of incumbents adopting “tradi-
tional” modes of service provision. It was argued that the entry into the 
market of innovative undertakings, such as GPS-based taxi despatch ser-
vice providers, to the extent that they enjoy significant competitive advan-
tages compared with incumbent providers, can enhance the quality of the 
offer and lower costs, thus lowering the barriers to entering into the taxi 
market and reducing costs for drivers. The affirmation of app-based call 
despatch services can therefore be regarded as a major change in the way 
in which the taxi industry works: as illustrated in section 2.2, these new 
tools allow drivers to manage their working time more efficiently by iden-
tifying and therefore responding more quickly to potential passengers in 
their proximity at any given time.29 Passengers also benefit greatly from 
app-based call despatchers, since they can identify and track the car allo-
cated to their request and rely on additional services such as online, cash-
less payment.30
The entry of these innovative providers, however, had extremely signifi-
cant consequences, and not just for how these markets operate, but also 
for the observance of labour and safety standards and, more generally, 
for the existing regulatory structures affecting taxi service provision in 
each jurisdiction. The entry into a number of taxi markets of Uber can 
be regarded as a major shock for the way in which taxi services had been, 
respectively, provided by drivers and regulated by the competent authori-
ties, in accordance with a plethora of national and local rules. Discussing 
the impact of Uber on the New York taxi industry, Wyman argued that 
Uber represented a radical departure from the traditional “medallion” sys-
tem, to the extent that it had a “contractual relationship” with its drivers 
29 See e.g. Decision of 27 June 2018, MyTaxi/Samarcanda/Pronto Taxi/RadioTaxi 3570, Case I801A, 
paragraph 203.
30 Ibid, paragraph 204.
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not as an employer, but as a “fleet manager”.31 Taxi drivers, therefore, 
retained their independent status; this has had a number of important 
consequences for their status as “workers” and for their access to a number 
of benefits and social welfare entitlements, such as sick pay.32 In addition, 
there is the question of whether Uber as a platform should be licensed to 
operate its services, and the similar issue of whether drivers should obtain 
a license, in accordance with the relevant national and local requirements. 
In relation to the status of drivers, Uber initially resisted regulation and 
in particular the imposition of licensing requirements on drivers, such as 
fingerprinting and background checks.33
The questions concerning the status of Uber drivers – whether they 
should be regarded as independent contractors, as Uber wished, or as 
employees or workers – were addressed by the Court of Justice of the EU in 
the Uber Spain preliminary ruling.34 The Court refused to accept that the 
service provided by Uber, namely “connecting a non-professional driver 
using his or her own vehicle with a person who wishes to make an urban 
journey”, could be defined as just an “information society service”, and as 
such fall outside the scope of the regulation of other services, especially 
taxi transportation services.35 The Court took the view that Uber’s services 
were “more than an intermediation service” since, without the platform, it 
would not have been possible for non-professional drivers to offer passen-
gers their services, nor for passengers to access these services.36
In addition, Uber exercised “decisive influence” on the drivers: through 
the app, it determined the fare for each ride, facilitated payment and 
exerted a certain degree of control on the quality of vehicles.37 The Court 
of Justice therefore concluded that the “intermediation service” could not 
be separated from the “main component of a transport service”.38 Uber, as 
such, was a provider of transportation services and was therefore subject to 
31 Wyman, “Taxi regulation”, 13-14; see also page 11.
32 Ibid, 9.
33 See e.g. Jonathan Hall et al, “Occupational licensing of Uber drivers”, 2018, https://site.stan-
ford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj8706/f/5211-jh_occupational_licensing_of_uber_drivers_for_confer-
ence_posting.1.pdf, 3-4.
34 Judgment of 20 December 2017, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxis v. Uber Spain SL, C-434/15, 
ECLI:EU:2017:981.
35 Ibid, paragraphs 34-37.
36 Ibid, paragraph 39.
37 Ibid, paragraph 39.
38 Ibid, paragraph 40.
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the rules that each member state and its local authorities had laid down for 
regulating the provision on “non-public transport services”, such as taxi 
services,39 and which often included licensing obligations and the imposi-
tion of safety standards for drivers.40
It is beyond the scope of this contribution to engage in a detailed analysis 
of the Uber Spain ruling and its implications for the future of what is com-
monly called the “sharing economy”. However, the ripple effects of this 
decision were extremely significant, since the judgment meant that Uber 
was under the obligation to seek a license in every EU city where it wished 
to operate. The decision of Transport for London to deny Uber a license to 
operate can be regarded as a very emblematic case of the fallout from this 
ruling. The impact of Uber’s entry on the London taxi market had been 
“profound”, although not all its implications were regarded as positive.41
Transport for London considered Uber’s terms of services and its prac-
tices concerning the selection and identification of drivers.42 The decision 
focused on the platform’s inability to ensure the identity of its own driv-
ers and on its de facto inability to stop drivers that had previously been 
excluded from providing services through it to recreate accounts. It was 
found that Uber’s systems remained relatively weak and open to manipu-
lation, thus falling short of safety standards essential for the security of 
passengers.43 Against this background, it can be argued that the decision 
to exclude Uber from operating on the London taxi market was perhaps 
inevitable, since, due to the manner in which the platform operated, the 
all-important concern for passenger safety, which is at the core of any 
taxi regulation mechanism, could not be addressed. It is acknowledged 
that the Uber case is characterised by unique features, of which the most 
prominent is certainly the fact that this platform was aimed primarily at 
owners of private vehicles who wished to provide rides upon payment to 
39 Ibid, paragraphs 46-47.
40 Ex multis, see Serena Natile, “Is Uber a taxi service?”, KSLR EU Law Blog, January 11, 2018, https://
blogs.kcl.ac.uk/kslreuropeanlawblog/?p=1214#.XoxSd4hKjIU; see also Vassilis Hatzopoulos, 
“After Uber Spain: The EU’s approach on the sharing economy in need of review?”, European Law 
Review 44, no. 1 (2019): 96 and 99.
41 See inter alia Walter Skok and Samantha Baker, “Evaluating the impact of Uber on London’s 
taxi services: A strategic review”, Knowledge & Process Management 25, no. 4 (2018): 234 and 235.
42 Decision of 25 November 2019, Transport for London, press release: https://tfl.gov.uk/info-for/
media/press-releases/2019/november/uber-london-limited-found-to-be-not-fit-and-proper-to-
hold-a-private-hire-operator-licence. 
43 Transport for London, loc. ult. cit.
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passengers as a “side activity”. However, it could legitimately be queried 
whether a similar, cautious approach to granting an authorisation could 
be expected also in relation to more traditional platforms used by licensed, 
professional taxi-drivers. The next section will consider these implica-
tions in light of EU competition rules and in particular Article 101 TFEU 
by examining the MyTaxi decisions, adopted by the Italian Competition 
Authority (hereinafter referred to as AGCM).
2.2.  MyTaxi: innovative business models against the resistance provided by 
existing modes of service provision?
The previous section summarised the history of the arrival of Uber in 
the taxi services market of many cities around the world and showed, 
albeit briefly, how the appearance on a very regulated, relatively mature 
market such as this one of open, GPS-based, leaner platforms challenged 
consolidated ways of despatching taxi calls and remunerating existing 
incumbent providers of this service.
This section will turn to examining questions concerning the applicabil-
ity of Article 101 TFEU to the behaviour of taxi despatch services’ plat-
forms, in light of a set of decisions, concerning the taxi services’ markets 
in a number of Italian cities and focused on the implications of the entry 
of new, app-based call despatch service providers into this market which 
was hitherto organised according to “traditional” methods of intermedia-
tion. These decisions were adopted by the Italian Autorità Garante per la 
Concorrenza ed il Mercato (‘AGCM’) and concerned the compliance of the 
exclusivity clauses that were included in the agreements between radio-
taxi intermediaries and taxi drivers with EU competition rules.
The AGCM started the investigation of the market for call despatch ser-
vices in a number of Italian cities because of a complaint made by MyTaxi, 
a new app-based service provider. Part of a German corporate group, 
MyTaxi had attempted to break in the market for taxi service despatch-
ing in Rome and later in Milan and Naples. However, although many taxi 
drivers had downloaded the app, MyTaxi had experienced a significant 
number of unanswered “calls” from potential passengers, thereby prevent-
ing it from expanding on the relevant market.44
In November 2018 the company complained with the AGCM, alleging 
that the action of three incumbent phone despatchers in the Rome market 
44 Ibid, paragraph 39.
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for taxi despatch services, which was aimed at forbidding taxi drivers from 
seeking out work through rival platforms, had prevented it from expand-
ing on the relevant market. It was claimed that since “traditional opera-
tors” did not allow drivers that used their services to deal also with rival 
despatchers, new platforms were de facto unable to enter and establish 
themselves in this market.45 The incumbents countered that it was within 
their rights, in accordance with the relevant domestic law, to limit the free-
dom of those drivers that relied on their services, either as members or as 
“mere users”, to join competing platforms. In their view, the existence of a 
non-competition clause in the agreement of association signed by it and by 
individual drivers was indispensable for the maintenance and the attain-
ment of its mutualistic purpose, in line with Article 2527 of the Italian 
Civil Code.46
The incumbents argued that, in any event, app-based services did not 
belong to the same relevant market as the market for the provision of des-
patch services through “traditional” means (such as call centres, using 
the central booking like provided the local authority or hailing the cab at 
kerbside),47 due to significant, objective differences between “traditional” 
and “innovative” despatching services providers and to the characteris-
tics of demand for each service.48 The investigated entities also declined 
to admit that their non-competition clauses had led to MyTaxi being de 
facto excluded from the relevant market. They submitted that there was 
a sufficiently numerous group of “independent taxis” (namely taxi driv-
ers who did not subscribe to traditional platforms for despatching) that 
could therefore be “contested” by the new entrant.49 They argued that, in 
any event, even “tied” drivers could have exercised the right to terminate 
their contracts with the incumbent intermediaries and therefore move to 
MyTaxi without having to bear significant costs.50
The decision rejected these claims one by one. In respect of the defi-
nition of the relevant market, the AGCM took the view that app-based 
services such as those run by MyTaxi were in direct competition with, 
and therefore belonged to the same market as, the services offered by 
45 Ibid, paragraph 2-3.
46 Ibid, paragraphs 32-33.
47 Ibid, paragraph 140.
48 Ibid, paragraphs 139-140.
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid, paragraphs 157-158; see also paragraphs 161-162.
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traditional platforms.51 It was emphasised that both services fulfilled the 
same economic function, namely to allow taxi drivers to access and man-
age demand for their services. The decision acknowledged that the mar-
ket was two-sided and consequently that the position of the users of these 
services should also be taken into account.52 However, it found that the 
focus of each taxi despatch services provider was to address the taxi driv-
ers’ demands for a reliable mechanism to reach out to those requiring taxi 
journeys.53 Accordingly, the AGCM took the view that the predominant 
aspect of the assessment should be the examination of the “business-to-
business” side of this market, namely the implications of the relationship 
between platforms and driver-users.54 Since “traditional” and app-based 
platforms allowed their users to achieve the same objective, namely to 
maximise the number of journeys in their working time. The circum-
stance that these services were provided either through a radio and a call 
centre or by means of a smartphone and a GPS tracker had no bearing on 
this conclusion.55
The decision moved on to consider the legality of the non-competition 
clauses contained in each of the association agreements stipulated between 
taxi drivers and the cooperative associations under investigation. It was 
recognised that, in principle, domestic law could restrain the freedom of 
members of not-for-profit entities to, inter alia, contract with rivals of the 
same entities if this was regarded as necessary to protect the mutualis-
tic purpose of these associations. However, the AGCM emphasised that 
these rules should have been read in such a way as to avoid frustrating the 
full effectiveness of EU competition law.56 On that basis, the AGCM ques-
tioned whether the non-competition clauses at issue remained compatible 
with Article 101 TFEU for being “strictly related and necessary” to achieve 
their purported objective. This assessment entailed consideration of the 
duration, the scope and the magnitude of the effects of these clauses on 
both the drivers’ freedom to seek out more advanced alternatives.
The decision observed that the non-competition clauses affected all 
users of the services offered by the investigated cooperatives, regardless 
51 Ibid, paragraph 205.
52 Ibid, paragraph 206.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid, paragraph 208.
55 Ibid, paragraph 206.
56 Ibid, paragraphs 219-220.
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of whether the former were members of the associations or just users (on 
an occasional basis) of their services. The clauses had unlimited duration. 
In addition, they affected the provision of services on a market that was 
already heavily regulated as regards prices. Accordingly, non-price com-
petition, based on the nature of the service offered, for instance, and/or 
on the provision of additional services (such as remote payment) were 
regarded as indispensable to counterbalance the presence of relatively few 
leading providers and of any barriers to entry or expansion originating 
from the regulatory framework assisting this industry.57
The AGCM emphasised that the new app-based services allowed taxi 
drivers to optimise working time by selecting jobs that were geographi-
cally close to them at any particular time (thanks to the positioning tech-
nology used), without start-up costs – all that was needed was a smart-
phone endowed with GPS positioning software.58 Traditional despatching 
instead required drivers to source radio equipment at a cost.59 App-based 
services provided a very innovative option to consumers (namely, taxi 
passengers seeking a ride) as well. Thanks to the geolocalisation services, 
passengers could both book and track a taxi until pick up, thus avoiding 
the risk of “no-show”. The additional payment services provided by the 
app-based platform and the possibility to rate services in each case added 
to the efficiency of the service and allowed consumers a real opportunity 
to influence service quality.60
In light of these considerations, the AGCM found that, compared with 
the nature of the services offered by traditional platforms, app-based 
intermediaries represented an innovative option for consumers as well as 
for drivers and were, as such, capable of putting competitive pressure on 
the incumbent providers.61 The assessment as to the legality of the non-
competition clause hinged, therefore, on the question of whether the non-
competition obligations imposed on users of traditional platforms had 
precluded app-based providers from accessing the relevant market.62 In 
other words, taking into account both the number of independent taxi 
drivers and of those drivers that were bound by an obligation not to join 
57 Ibid, paragraphs 224 and 227.
58 Ibid, paragraph 226; see also paragraph 232.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid, paragraph 227, see also paragraphs 233-234.
61 See paragraphs 226 and 227; see also paragraph 229.
62 Ibid, paragraph 227; see also paragraph 235.
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service providers competing with the platform they used, were there suf-
ficient drivers an app-based provider could rely on in order to satisfy the 
demand for transport services channelled through its app?
The AGCM acknowledged that, in light of their legal and economic 
context and due to their purpose, these clauses were not restrictions of 
competition ‘by object’. However, it made clear that they could nonethe-
less have anti-competitive effects. To assess whether such effects existed 
as a result, the AGCM relied on the EU Court of Justice’s Delimitis test.63 
First, it was indispensable to assess the share of supply of the goods in 
question insulated from outside competition as a result of the exclusivity 
obligations, and to consider whether its size was such that it would not be 
viable for new or existing entrants to expand on the affected market. The 
second prong of the test relates more specifically to the non-competition/
exclusivity clause in examination, and considers whether they had actually 
precluded the complainant from entering in or expanding on the relevant 
market.64
The AGCM found that the relevant market was already relatively con-
centrated: there were only a few rivals, and their market shares had been 
constant over a significant period of time.65 In addition, only a relative 
small share of taxi drivers operating across the city of Rome did so without 
relying on the intermediation services offered by one of the market leaders. 
However, these drivers were “committed independents” and had therefore 
manifested no intention to access despatching services.66 
In light of the forgoing analysis, the AGCM took the view that if one took 
into account the number of “tied” drivers and, consequently, the share of 
capacity (in terms of number of journeys) that could be despatched solely 
via radio-based platforms, only a limited share of drivers and, therefore, 
of journeys could be potentially despatched by an app-based intermedi-
ary. As for drivers using traditional intermediaries, the decision also found 
that drivers using traditional intermediaries were very reluctant and there-
fore unlikely to switch to MyTaxi, although the app-based services were 
less costly and more efficient. This was owed to the fear that, once they had 
63 See paragraph 235; Judgment of 28 February 1991, Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu AG, 
C-234/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:91.
64 Judgment of 28 February 1991, Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu AG, C-234/89, 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:91, paragraphs 19-24.
65 Decision of 27 June 2018, MyTaxi/Samarcanda/Pronto Taxi/RadioTaxi 3570, Case I801A, para-
graphs 236-237.
66 Ibid, paragraph 239. 
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done so, they would have become ineligible for the services provided by the 
traditional platform they had been using and would have therefore lost a 
significant part of their customers.67 
On this basis, the AGCM concluded that the first condition outlined in 
Delimitis had been met since, due to the arrangements, the new entrant 
would have faced scarce capacity and been unable to satisfy demand from 
customers coming through its own app.68 The assessment moved to the 
second Delimitis condition. The AGCM identified the percentage of unan-
swered calls for a taxi lodged via the MyTaxi app as the proxy for evaluat-
ing the foreclosure effect of the incumbents’ arrangements vis-à-vis the 
new entrant.69 The decision found that since entering the relevant market 
MyTaxi had struggled to find taxi drivers to fill 50% of the demand for 
tax services managed through the app. The AGCM took the view that the 
cause of scarcity was not eclusively due to “structural” market factors, such 
as the very limited number of independent taxis who were “interested” in 
centralised despatching. It was also due to the impact of the non-compe-
tition obligations imposed by traditional platforms on drivers using their 
services, as a result of which the latter could not “multi-home” (i.e. they 
could not rely on a variety of demand sourcing channels, as opposed to 
exclusively on radio-based service providers).70 
The decision found that since taxi drivers who were not “tied” to a plat-
form were limited in number and those already associated to a traditional 
intermediary were dissuaded from working with MyTaxi by the concern 
for losing membership of their cooperative, there was very limited space 
for the new app to enter and grow in the relevant market.71 In particular, 
the AGCM pointed to evidence showing that while a significant number of 
drivers had downloaded the MyTaxi app, the actual number of drivers who 
had accepted a “job” sourced via their smartphone had decreased gradu-
ally, leading to a situation where the intermediary could no longer fill up 
to 50% of the requests placed by its users.72 In its view, such a downward 
trend was directly linked to the non-competition obligations imposed on 
drivers by the investigated cooperative association.73 
67 Ibid, paragraphs 243, 245-247.
68 Ibid, paragraph 247; see also paragraphs 271-272.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid, paragraphs 253, 255-256.
71 Ibid, paragraph 253; see also paragraphs 255-256.
72 Ibid, paragraph 262.
73 Ibid.
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The decision concluded that these clauses prevented not only coopera-
tive members but also mere users from taking advantage of the demand 
sourced through the app.74 This, in turn, precluded the expansion of 
MyTaxi on the relevant market for the despatch of taxi services in the city 
of Rome.75 As a result, the AGCM took the view that since they foreclosed 
a new entry and/or expansion of a rival to the benefit of the incumbents, 
the non-competition obligations imposed by the radio-based intermediar-
ies on all drivers using their services were incompatible with Article 101 
TFEU.76
The importance of the findings made in MyTaxi should not be under-
stated. The AGCM relied on a number of established approaches to the 
assessment of exclusivity and non-competition clauses and found that 
especially when these obligations are of unlimited duration and go as far 
as to bind mere users of these services, they not only jeopardise the entry 
of more innovative service providers, but also prejudice the welfare of con-
sumers, who are denied the many benefits of app-based platforms.
2.3.  More about the MyTaxi “saga”: the decisions concerning taxi 
despatching in Milan and Naples
The MyTaxi decision is a very significant development in respect of cur-
rent competition law approaches to platforms, especially ‘closed’ ones. 
While the Italian competition agency did not outlaw outright this type of 
intermediaries, it nonetheless sent a powerful message to them, by limit-
ing quite strictly the scope of any non-competition clauses they may wish 
to impose on their users. This however was only the first of a short series 
of decisions that have addressed the difficulties experienced by MyTaxi in 
trying to enter into the taxi despatching services market in a number of 
Italian cities. In a later decision, the AGCM had to deal with a similar com-
plaint concerning the imposition of a similar non-competition obligation 
on taxi drivers using the services of four incumbent intermediaries active 
in the city of Milan.77 
MyTaxi’s complaint was similar to the one leading to the 2018 deci-
sion. Two of the parties, TaxiBlu and Autoradiotassi, were cooperative 
74 Ibid, paragraphs 273-274.
75 Ibid, paragraph 266.
76 Ibid, paragraphs 283-284.
77 Decision of 27 June 2018 MyTaxi/TaxiBlu/YellowTaxi/Autoradiotassi, Case I801B, available at: 
https://www.agcm.it/dotcmsDOC/allegati-news/I801B_ch.%20istr._omi.pdf. 
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associations and had raised similar arguments as to the respondents in the 
Rome investigation: these clauses were necessary to protect their mutual-
istic purpose.78 YellowTaxi, however, was a commercial undertaking.79 It 
argued before the AGCM that according to Article 1567 of the Italian Civil 
Code, concerning exclusivity clauses in contracts for the provision of ser-
vices, service providers could prevent their customers from either obtain-
ing services from a third party (namely a rival of the service provider) or 
from providing the same service in-house.80
Just as with the Rome case, the AGCM rejected the allegation that this 
type of exclusivity clause was ‘indispensable’ for the existence of the rela-
tionship between service provider and acquirer because it served the inter-
ests of both parties and was therefore aimed at preserving the profitability 
of the deal for both service provider and acquirer.81 It was observed that 
this clause was both of unlimited duration and of overly extensive scope, 
since it bound both long-term customers of YellowTaxi and occasional 
users, with whom the company had an “oral contract”. The AGCM con-
cluded that the non-competition clause, despite prima facie being consist-
ent with Article 1567 of the Civil Code, was incompatible with Article 101 
TFEU for going beyond what was indispensable to attain the objectives 
that this provision was aimed to secure.82 
On the basis of the Delimitis test,83 the AGCM found that the non-com-
petition clauses had contributed significantly to sealing off a market that 
was already both very regulated and characterised by significant barriers 
to entry and expansion, such as the “sunk costs” associated to adhering 
to the traditional, radio-based platforms. As a result of these non-com-
petition obligations, drivers were strongly deterred from seeking out the 
services offered by an app-based platform such as MyTaxi.84
It is suggested that the AGCM has taken a very strong stance in favour of 
opening up the taxi despatch services market, out of a concern for avoid-
ing consolidating positions of market power and the strengthening of bar-
riers to entry likely to work against more efficient rivals. In this context, 
both decisions emphasised that the exclusive reliance on closed platforms 
78 Ibid, paragraphs 28-29.
79 Ibid, paragraphs 4 and 6.
80 Ibid, paragraph 30.
81 Ibid, paragraphs 135 and 138.
82 Ibid, paragraphs 193-196.
83 Ibid, paragraphs 241-246.
84 Ibid, paragraphs 220-223.
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could lead to the inefficient allocation of taxi services, since drivers would 
be unlikely to use their capacity fully and passengers would consequently 
be likely to wait longer and potentially pay more for their journeys.85 
The MyTaxi ‘saga’, however, did not stop with the above decisions. In 
February 2019, the AGCM adopted interim measures against a number 
of taxi despatch intermediaries active in the city of Naples on the grounds 
that the closed platforms that the investigated firms operated presented a 
concrete risk for the maintenance of competition on this market.86 It was 
found that the incumbent firms had sought to discourage taxi drivers asso-
ciated with their platforms from also using the services offered by MyTaxi 
by making threats to terminate the contract concluded by the incumbent 
with individual drivers and issuing warnings against installing the apps in 
question.87 The decision held that since these practices had been adopted 
when MyTaxi had not established a customer base, in the form of drivers 
using its services, the action of the incumbent was capable of dissuading 
individual taxi drivers from using open platforms, thus leading to a loss of 
competition on the call despatch market as well as on the market for the 
delivery of transport services to consumers.88
In light of the above analysis, it can be concluded that the MyTaxi deci-
sions represent something of a “shake-up” of the way in which the market 
for the provision of taxi despatch services has operated so far. It is argued 
that by outlawing the exclusivity clauses that had thus far ensured that a 
steady supply of taxi services would be managed by the taxi phone lines, 
the latter had made it very difficult for new entrants to threaten their mar-
ket leadership in a number of important Italian cities. The foreclosing 
effect of these clauses was also held to be an obstacle to innovation and to 
the entry into the market of undertakings that could provide these services 
in novel ways that could deal more effectively with consumers’ demands. 
How do the MyTaxi decisions fit with the current interpretation of Article 
101 TFEU? And what are the possible implications of adopting a similar 
position in the future for the development of the approach of competition 
85 See e.g. Decision of 27 June 2018, MyTaxi/Samarcanda/Pronto Taxi/RadioTaxi 3570, Case I801A, 
paragraphs 92-94.
86 Decision of 13 February 2019, Servizi di Prenotazione del Trasporto Taxi – Napoli, Case I832, 
available at: https://www.agcm.it/dotcmsCustom/getDominoAttach?urlStr=192.168.14.10:8080/
41256297003874BD/0/E7B2BD080673DA7CC12583AC0059209B/$File/p27553.pdf (hereinafter 
referred to as MyTaxi Napoli decision). 
87 Ibid, paragraphs 28-29.
88 Ibid, paragraph 30. 
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law to platform markets? The next sections will examine in greater detail 
the approach adopted by the Italian competition authority in light of the 
practice developed by other competition agencies and by the EU judiciary 
in relation to similar questions. 
3. Competition law and platform-based industries: time for change?
3.1.  The notion of ‘ancillary restrictions’ and exclusivity clauses:  
is this the end of closed platforms?
The previous sections examined the MyTaxi decisions adopted by the 
AGCM and argued that the Italian competition authority sent a powerful 
signal toward taxi despatch intermediaries, warning them that the enforce-
ment of exclusivity clauses might infringe EU competition rules. The pur-
pose of this section is to look more closely at the interpretation of Article 
101 TFEU adopted by the AGCM in the MyTaxi cases. Section 3.1 noted 
that the Italian competition agency rejected the arguments raised by the 
investigated companies and in favour of excluding app-based platforms 
from the same relevant market as the one to which “traditional” interme-
diaries belonged. The MyTaxi/Rome decision emphasised that since both 
service providers fulfilled the same economic function, namely to mediate 
between taxi drivers and prospective passengers, albeit by using different 
technologies, there was no justification for considering these separate rel-
evant markets.89 
In this respect, a parallel can be drawn with a decision of the 
Bundeskartellamt (BKamT), the German Competition Office, concern-
ing the legality of a number of practices adopted by “bricks-and-mortar” 
travel agents in response to the entry in the market for the provision of 
these services of online platforms providing hotel and travel bookings. In 
the HRS decision, the BKamT found that “traditional” and online travel 
agents formed part of a two-sided market.90 One segment concerned the 
provision of intermediation services to businesses, such as hotels and travel 
companies; the other segment, instead, sought to respond to the requests 
89 Decision of 27 June 2018, MyTaxi/Samarcanda/Pronto Taxi/RadioTaxi 3570, Case I801A, para-
graphs 32-33; see also paragraphs 139-140.
90 Decision of the Bundeskartellamt of 20 December 2013, HRS, Case B9-66/10, available at: https://
www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/EN/Entscheidungen/Kartellverbot/
B9-66-10.pdf%3F__blob%3DpublicationFile%26v%3D3, paragraphs 2-3; see also paragraphs 
71-73 and 100-103.
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of individual consumers who wished to book transport and accommoda-
tion services, standalone or in conjunction with one another.91 
Regasrding the “business-to-business” segment in particular, the 
German competition agency rejected the claims that online service pro-
viders belonged to a distinct market vis-à-vis the one in which traditional 
travel agents operated. Instead, it took the view that both online and 
“bricks-and-mortar” providers were regarded by hotels (especially, it was 
found, small and medium sized ones) as mutually substitutable.92 In this 
specific respect, the HRS decision drew a distinction between online travel 
agents and hotel websites: it was found that the latter belonged to a differ-
ent market because they only served to promote individual hotels or hotel 
chains with a view to selling their services through an online technology.93 
Against this background, it is submitted that the AGCM’s analysis of the 
relevant market is broadly consistent with established demand- and sup-
ply-side substitutability theories that characterise the approach adopted by 
other European authorities. Just as in the HRS decision, the Italian com-
petition authority’s analysis appeared to be centred in the economic func-
tions call despatch services’ providers fulfilled on each of the sides of the 
market, as well as on how the intensity of competition and the possibility 
to enter into or to expand on the business-to-business segment affected 
rivalry and entry on the consumer segment.94 In addition, it is important 
to note that the AGCM’s view of market definition is “technology neutral”; 
in other words, it focuses on the nature of the economic activity being 
performed by each firm as opposed to the way in which they offer their 
services – whether in a traditional shop or on the internet.95 
The MyTaxi decisions remain compatible with the EU acquis also when 
it comes to the assessment of the non-competition clauses and in par-
ticular of their conformity to the criteria of ‘ancillarity’ enshrined in the 
CJEU’s case law. In the Remia judgment, for instance, the Court of Justice 
91 Ibid, paragraphs 102-103. For commentary, see inter alia Pál Szilagy, “Online travel agents and 
competition law”, European Competition Law Review 39, no. 10 (2018): 439-440.
92 HRS decision, paragraphs 76-77.
93 Szilagy, “Online”, 441. See Decision of the Bundeskartellamt of 20 December 2013, HRS, Case 
B9-66/10, paragraph 73.
94 Decision of 27 June 2018, MyTaxi/Samarcanda/Pronto Taxi/RadioTaxi 3570, Case I801A, para-
graphs 245-246; para. 271-272.
95 See e.g. paragraph 204 of Decision of 27 June 2018, MyTaxi/Samarcanda/Pronto Taxi/RadioTaxi 
3570, Case I801A. See also Decision of the Bundeskartellamt of 20 December 2013, HRS, Case 
B9-66/10, paragraph 73.
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held that not every restriction on the freedom of action of the parties to an 
arrangement infringed Article 101 TFEU, and this was also true of ‘non-
competition’ clauses.96 The Court acknowledged that imposing this obliga-
tion was frequent in the context of certain business transactions (such as, 
for instance, the agreement for the sale of a business) and could even be 
indispensable to ensure that a deal could take actual effect. Thus, as long 
as its anti-competitive effects were “inherent in the pursuit” of the public 
interest objectives that the restraint aimed to attain and the restriction 
at issue did not appear to go beyond what was necessary to secure these 
objectives, Article 101(1) TFEU would not apply.97
The EU Commission adopted a similar view in relation to other non-
competition clauses, such as “non-poaching agreements”, namely the 
agreement not to seek to hire any staff of the other parties to a broader 
arrangement for a fixed period post-deal. These types of clauses are often 
contained in merger deals.98 The EU Commission has taken the view in 
a number of decisions that these obligations can be regarded as “strictly 
related and necessary” to the implementation of a merger, as long as they 
are limited in time, concern “key staff” and are restricted in order to reflect 
the “scope of the business” being transferred.99
The approach outlined above can be compared with the position of the 
AGCM in the MyTaxi decisions. The AGCM found that while the clauses 
at issue were in the abstract consistent with Italian law governing, respec-
tively, cooperative association and service companies, they went beyond 
what was “necessary” to attain the goals pursued by the relevant domes-
tic rules.100 The decision acknowledged that non-competition obligations 
were permissible under Articles 1567 and 2527 of the Civil Code. However, 
it took issue with the breadth of these obligations, which were both of 
unlimited duration and encompassed all users of the traditional platforms, 
96 See e.g. Judgment of 11 July 1985, Remia BV and others v. Commission of the European 
Communities, case 42/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:327, paragraphs 19 and 31-32.
97 Judgment of 19 February 2002, J. C. J. Wouters, J. W. Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse 
Belastingadviseurs BV v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, intervener: Raad 
van de Balies van de Europese Gemeenschap, C-309/99, ECLI:EU:C:2002:98, paragraph 97; see also 
paragraph 107.
98 See, ex multis, Decision of 29 April 1998, ICI/Williams, Case no IV.M/1167, 5-6; see Riccardo 
Tremolada, “Anti-competitive restraints in labour markets-antitrust enforcement in respect of 
anti-competitive agreements”, European Competition Law Review 40, no.10 (2019): 457.
99 Tremolada, “Anti-competitive”, 457.
100 See paragraphs 215-217, 221 of Decision of 27 June 2018, MyTaxi/Samarcanda/Pronto Taxi/
RadioTaxi 3570, Case I801A. 
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regardless of whether they were members of the cooperative associations 
or mere users of these services. In the AGCM’s view, the statutory objec-
tives at issue could have been attained without restricting the freedom of 
action of the affected taxi drivers so significantly, for instance by requiring 
only members of the cooperatives to refrain from seeking the services of 
a rival platform.101 Limiting the reach of these clauses in this way would 
have gone some way toward creating some space for competing despatch 
services providers, including app-based platforms such as MyTaxi, by 
increasing their opportunity to recruit new drivers and, therefore, fulfil 
the requests for service placed by app users.102
The assessment of the non-competition clause in light of the Delimitis 
test is another key feature of the MyTaxi decisions. The AGCM questioned 
whether the exclusivity clause contained in the intermediaries’ contracts 
with taxi drivers increased the foreclosure of a market whose contestabil-
ity was already affected by the existence of similar arrangements. It is sub-
mitted that the way in which this assessment was approached is consistent 
with recent EU acquis. A parallel can be drawn between these decisions 
and the recent CJEU’s preliminary ruling in Maxima Latvija, for instance. 
The ruling arose from a dispute concerning the validity of a commercial 
real estate lease agreement: among its clauses was a stipulation that existing 
lessees could oppose the lessor’s decision to let premises belonging to the 
same complex out to new tenants.103 The Court of Justice held that a similar 
clause limited the freedom of the lessor to decide whom to lease property 
to since it subjected the decision to the consent of existing lessees.104
This clause was also found to prevent potential lessees from entering the 
retail market on the grounds that it could stop them from establishing a 
physical foothold in a certain area and thereby exercise pressure on the 
existing incumbent lessees, whose tenancy gave them the right to “filter 
out” new rivals. In the words of the Court of Justice, subjecting a new 
lease to the assent of existing tenants could de facto “price out” “Maxima 
Latvija’s competitors (…) [from] some shopping centres in which that com-
pany operates a large shop or hypermarket”.105 Consequently, this decision 
101 Decision of 27 June 2018, MyTaxi/Samarcanda/Pronto Taxi/RadioTaxi 3570, Case I801A, para-
graph 218; see also paragraph 221.
102 Ibid, paragraph 217.
103 Judgment of 26 November 2015, SIA “Maxima Latvija” v. Konkurences padome, C-345/14, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:784, paragraph 15.
104 See e.g. paragraphs 21-22.
105 Ibid, paragraph 22; see also paragraphs 18-19 and 27.
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presents a clear parallel with the exclusivity clauses at issue in MyTaxi, to 
the extent that it discouraged new entry in the retail market in respect of 
which estate agents provided an important intermediation service.
The Court of Justice acknowledged that this clause was not a “serious” 
infringement of competition law and on that basis held that the court seized 
with the dispute should have looked at the practice in light of the Delimitis 
test. To this end, the court should have taken into account the existence of 
regulatory barriers to entry106 and the question of whether new entrants 
could have found alternative space in a different location within the same 
geographic area.107 If the answer was affirmative, the court should have 
considered whether the agreement at issue contributed to sealing off this 
market to an appreciable extent as regards the position of the parties on 
the market and the duration of the agreement.108
In light of the forgoing analysis, it is argued that the MyTaxi decisions 
are consistent with the CJEU’s approach as in, among other authorities, 
Maxijima Latvia: the AGCM considered the regulatory barriers to the taxi 
market and highlighted the considerable market share held by the investi-
gated traditional platforms, all of whom tied their business customers with 
exclusivity obligations.109 Thereafter, the decision examined the foreclosing 
impact on MyTaxi and in light of its inability to expand its pool of drivers 
found that, as a result, it was also unable to meet demand on the consumer 
market.110 On that basis, the AGCM reached the conclusion that while the 
arrangements at issue were not serious infringements of Article 101 TFEU, 
they nonetheless had an anti-competitive impact, since they had prevented 
a newcomer from expanding on the market despite offering an innovative 
and appealing service.111
It can therefore be concluded that the MyTaxi decisions are not only 
consistent with EU precedent, but also an example of how the impact of 
technologically advanced new entrants can challenge the position of the 
106 Ibid, paragraph 27. See also, mutatis mutandis, Judgment of 6 December 2017, Coty Germany 
GmbH v. Parfümerie Akzente GmbH, Case 230/16, ECLI: EU: C: 2017: 941; see Opinion of AG 
Wahl delivered on 26 July 2017, Coty Germany GmbH v. Parfümerie Akzente GmbH, Case 230/16, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:603, paragraphs 62-63.
107 Ibid, paragraphs 28-29.
108 Ibid, paragraph 29; see also paragraph 31.
109 See Decision of 27 June 2018, MyTaxi/Samarcanda/Pronto Taxi/RadioTaxi 3570, Case I801A, 
paragraphs 143-145; see also paragraphs 239-242.
110 Ibid, paragraphs 253-256; see also paragraphs 283-285.
111 Ibid, paragraph 223.
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incumbents and their approach to providing services. The next section will 
consider some of the possible implications of the application of European 
competition rules to the operation of platforms more generally and espe-
cially the possibility of the latter to “control” in any way the size of their 
user base, especially their business-to-business segment.
3.2. MyTaxi and the future of despatch platforms: all change?
The previous section analysed the approach prevailing in the MyTaxi 
decisions and suggested that the Italian competition agency succeeded in 
constructing a sound and coherent theory of harm and a set of equally 
compelling legal arguments, the latter based on the EU precedent in this 
area. This section will explore, albeit briefly, some of the implications of 
these decisions for the future of this market and, in particular, for the 
development of these platforms.
It is undoubted that the arrival of app-based intermediaries on the mar-
ket for the provision of taxi despatch services represents a dramatic change 
in the way in which we think about “calling a cab”. As illustrated in section 
2, these providers are not only efficient because, thanks to the GPS and 
the real-time positioning, they allow taxi drivers to employ their work-
ing time more efficiently. They are also less expensive due to the lack of 
start-up costs. Finally, app-based providers are more “consumer-friendly”, 
since they enable users to, inter alia, track the chosen car, “fix” the cost 
of the ride and pay it in advance, and book services in their own mother 
language. Their entry into the market has, however, been met with some-
thing of a backlash from incumbents. Regulators were also concerned by 
the entry of some app-based providers.
The earlier discussion concerning Uber, contained in section 2.1, illus-
trated how much its entry on to these markets was resisted for a number 
of different reasons. Regulators wished to continue imposing regulatory 
requirements (such as the obligation to ensure the identity of drivers, their 
compliance with the duty to take up insurance and their “good standing”), 
which they saw as essential for the pursuit of important public policy objec-
tives.112 Similar objections were also made vis-à-vis Uber’s practices on 
the basis of the perceived need to protect the rights of drivers themselves, 
112 See e.g., Wyman, “Taxi regulation”, 22-24. See also, mutatis mutandis, Decision of 25 November 
2019, Transport for London.
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especially in terms of, inter alia, pay and sick leave entitlements.113 Existing 
taxi drivers and call despatch operators were just as vocal.114 Should driv-
ers be “compensated” in some way?115 Should existing intermediaries be 
able to maintain their pool of drivers in some way?
It is clear from the MyTaxi decisions that the latter concern was at the 
forefront of the radio-taxi platforms being investigated in all cases. As the 
cases showed, incumbents moved relatively promptly toward enforcing 
the exclusivity clauses contained in the agreements they stipulated with 
members, as well as with users. Consequently, the MyTaxi decisions have 
dealt a blow, in many ways, to the established approaches to how these ser-
vices are offered in several cities, and not just in Italy. As respects Italian 
markets, the AGCM’s investigative results indicated that the market for 
call despatch services was considerably regulated and characterised by the 
presence of a number of incumbent “closed” platforms who together held a 
significant share of demand. For instance, in the city of Rome, in 2017, this 
share was estimated to be in the region of between 60% and 75%, spread 
across the three incumbents investigated by the AGCM.116 Market share 
data were even more striking for the city of Milan, where the investigated 
platforms held jointly over 85% of the market for these services.117
Add to this the evidence of the circumstance that the majority of inde-
pendent drivers were committed to their own autonomy from despatch 
platforms of any kind118 and it will become clear that the non-competition 
clauses assisting incumbent platforms present an additional and rather 
113 See, inter alia, Debbie Woskow, “Unlocking the sharing economy – an independent review”, 
November 2014, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/378291/bis-14-1227-unlocking-the-sharing-economy-an-independent-
review.pdf, 32-33; most recently, in the UK, Rahim Nilufer, Katriina Lepanjuuri, Francesca Day, 
Hannah Piggott, Ruth Hudson and Klaudia Lubian, “Research on the sharing economy”, HMRC 
report 453, 5 May 2017, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/658728/HMRC_Report_453_Sharing_Economy.pdf, 48-50 (dis-
cussion of perception of employment status). 
114 See e.g., in relation to the “Medallion” system existing in the city of New York, Wyman, “Taxi 
regulation”, 77-78.
115 Ibid, 82-84.
116 Decision of 27 June 2018, MyTaxi/Samarcanda/Pronto Taxi/RadioTaxi 3570, Case I801A, para-
graph 272.
117 Decision of 27 June 2018, MyTaxi/TaxiBlu/YellowTaxi/Autoradiotassi, Case I801B, paragraphs 
95-96.
118 Decision of 27 June 2018, MyTaxi/Samarcanda/Pronto Taxi/RadioTaxi 3570, Case I801A, para-
graph 272.
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sizeable hurdle for newcomers.119 It was argued before the AGCM that 
drivers could have exercised their right to terminate their contract with 
the “traditional” intermediary. However, in light of the data on market 
shares outlined above, it can be agreed with the AGCM that terminating 
contracts for the purpose of directing business toward app-based provid-
ers could not constitute a reasonable and sustainable choice, since it would 
have led to the loss of the whole demand channelled via the traditional 
intermediaries.120
In light of the forgoing observations, would it be legitimate to argue that 
we are witnessing the end of “closed” platforms, at least in the market for 
the provision of intermediation services between taxi drivers and perspec-
tive passengers, given the impact that non-competition clauses might have 
on the entry or expansion of rival intermediaries? It could be argued that 
taxi despatchers can no longer demand full “loyalty” from their users and 
that they should accept having to operate in competition with other more 
innovative, cheaper and therefore more appealing intermediaries. At the 
same time, however, the nature of each intermediary and of the activi-
ties that each performs should be taken into account. Thus, it is submitted 
that it should still be possible for cooperative associations, for instance, to 
demand a degree of loyalty from their members by preventing them from 
seeking competing services from another platforms. Accordingly, coop-
erative associations might consider limiting the reach of these clauses only 
to their full members and leave “mere users” of their services at liberty 
to seek out services from “open” platforms, in competition with “closed” 
ones. 
Broadly similar views appear justified also in respect of platforms oper-
ated by commercial entities: however, just as with cooperatives, any limi-
tations should be restricted in duration and in scope to what is “strictly 
related and necessary” to safeguard the mutualistic nature of the associa-
tion or, respectively, to ensure the appropriate performance of the services 
contract.121 To satisfy these requirements, it may be necessary for mutual-
istic entities to limit the remit of these obligations to members, as opposed 
to mere users, or to restrict their duration for a start-up period. In any 
event, total exclusivity, as in the case of the intermediaries investigated in 
119 Ibid, paragraphs 273-275.
120 Ibid, paragraph 273; see also Decision of 27 June 2018 MyTaxi/TaxiBlu/YellowTaxi/
Autoradiotassi, Case I801B, paragraphs 243-244.
121 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, Tremolada, “Anti-competitive”, 462.
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MyTaxi, appears irreconcilable with Article 101 TFEU, since it would de 
facto seal off the relevant markets and slow down innovation and devel-
opment of this industry. On this point, a recent Competition Paper from 
the OECD Secretariat highlighted the need to avoid exclusionary prac-
tices, such as the imposition of a single-homing obligation for drivers, on 
the grounds that it could lead to higher prices and damage consumers.122 
These views were also shared by the former Chair of the Competition and 
Markets Authority, who argued that any proposal to allow platforms to 
prevent multi-homing (of drivers or of consumers) should be resisted since 
it would slow down new entries and eventually lead to less price- and qual-
ity-based competition.123
It is added that this position is also consistent with recent economic lit-
erature concerning the functioning of taxi services’ intermediation plat-
forms: in 2018, Bryan and Gans suggested that allowing drivers as well 
as consumers to rely on a variety of channels to, respectively, offer their 
services and seek a ride was likely to lead to lower prices and to reduce 
waiting times, providing that there is no incentive created by platforms to 
“compensate” drivers for choosing idleness.124 A 2020 study by Cusumano, 
Yoffie and Gawer, broadly confirming these views, suggested that multi-
homing could be regarded as a decisive factor in preventing the emergence 
of dominant intermediaries.125 They also argued that how individual plat-
forms deal with multi-homing is likely to be decisive for their survival 
in the industry in which they operate and speculate that their ability to 
reduce the scope for using more platforms than just one, on either side, 
may be necessary to ensure long-term viability and lead to greater product 
differentiation.126
122 Niccolò Comini, Beyza Erbaya and Chris Pike, “Taxi, ride-sourcing and ride-sharing services – 
a note from the secretariat”, OECD Competition Papers, DAF/COMP/WP2, 2018, https://one.oecd.
org/document/DAF/COMP/WP2(2018)1/en/pdf, paragraphs 136-137.
123 David Currie, “David Currie on the role of competition in stimulating innovation”, Speech 
at Concurrences Innovation Economics Conference, King’s College London, February 3, 2017, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/david-currie-on-the-role-of-competition-in-stimulat-
ing-innovation. See also Yseult Marique and Enguerrand Marique, “Uber in London – ç a battle 
between public and private regulation”, in Uber & Taxis – ç Comparative legal studies, ed. David 
Renders and Rozen Noguellou (Brussels, Bruyllant, 2018), at pages 175-176; see also page 194.
124 Kevin A. Bryan and Joshua S. Gans, “A theory of multihoming in ride-sharing competition”, 
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 28, no. 1 (2019): 94-95.
125 Michal A. Cusumano, David B. Yoffie and Annabelle Gawer, “The future of platfoms”, MIT 
Sloan Management Review 61, no. 3 (2020): 52.
126 Ibid, 49-50.
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Against this background, it is argued that the MyTaxi decisions are not 
only broadly consistent with the EU competition law acquis governing 
exclusivity clauses, but also compatible with the economic analysis con-
cerning the way in which platform-based markets work and which dem-
onstrates the importance of multi-homing as a decisive factor for ensuring 
the contestability of these markets. It is acknowledged, as suggested by 
Cusumano et al., that protecting the size of the platform’s user base may 
actually lead to the emergence of new, more innovative products and ser-
vices, thus encouraging quality-based rivalry in the long run.127 On this 
point, it should be emphasised that Article 101 TFEU does not prohibit all 
exclusivity clauses. As shown in MyTaxi, it remains possible for intermedi-
aries to demand a degree of “loyalty” from certain users of their services. 
However, it is submitted that the scope and the duration of these clauses is 
going to have to be strictly limited to make it possible for rival intermedi-
aries to enter and expand on this market, to the benefit of competition and 
consumer choice. 
In light of the forgoing analysis, it may be concluded that competition 
law is shaping the present and future of platform-based markets very sig-
nificantly by promoting openness and user choice on both segments of 
these industries. As technological solutions evolve, it is going to be impor-
tant, however, to ensure that both the understanding and the application 
of competition standards remain flexible and attuned with the need to 
encourage quality-based rivalry.
4.  Of taxis and beyond: open and closed platforms and the competi-
tion rules – Tentative conclusions
Platforms are a constant presence in many industries where intermediaries 
play an essential part in the “matching” of providers and users of certain 
services. Their peculiar features, such as their “two-sided” nature and the 
need for them to accumulate a certain critical mass of users in order to be 
viable, call for a careful assessment of the contractual practices that assist 
their functioning. Technological innovation, the emergence of the internet 
and of we call the “sharing economy” have fostered the entry into these 
markets of new operators whose business models are characterised by low 
costs, openness and flexibility.
127 Ibid.
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This contribution examined the consequences of the above changes for 
two-sided markets, where intermediaries play a key part in allowing ser-
vice providers to reach out to service users, and focused on the example 
offered by the taxi services’ industry, where the entry of undertakings 
using new business models reliant on technology is rather illustrative of 
these challenges. Section 2 summarised the economic implications of this 
transition and argued that the example of Uber, with its prima facie flex-
ibility, low costs and speed of access for both drivers and passengers has 
been particularly illustrative of the disruptive force of the new model. It 
was argued that the entry of innovative intermediaries had obvious ben-
efits for passengers, with lower fares and less waiting times, among other 
consequences. At the same time, it impacted drivers in a less positive and 
more unpredictable manner: incumbent drivers who relied on traditional 
methods of sourcing demand for their services saw, among other effects, 
a reduction of their revenues. Drivers who had chosen to avail of Uber’s 
services on their part reported decreasing satisfaction levels due to the 
extent of their dependency on the platform not just in relation to sourcing 
demand ,but also to the determination of fare prices and consequently of 
profit margins.128
Section 3 examined the implications of the entry of online, app-based 
platforms on the market for the despatch of calls to taxi drivers and in 
particular the question of whether incumbent platforms could in any way 
seek to maintain a certain level of supply for these services by binding their 
users to relying on their services. The contribution examined the MyTaxi 
decisions adopted by the Italian competition agency in respect of the use of 
loyalty clauses in the taxi despatching service market. It was acknowledged 
that the established corporate structures that provide similar services, and 
especially those performing a “mutualistic” function, should be allowed to 
“work well”, if necessary by seeking to maintain a degree of loyalty from 
their members. However, it was argued that there should always be a con-
crete opportunity for rivals (especially those who offer the same services 
in a less costly and more innovative and more consumer-friendly manner) 
to enter or expand their share of this market segment. For this purpose, 
any loyalty-inducing obligation should be carefully limited to ensure that 
service users retain a realistic opportunity to seek out alternative services 
128 See e.g. Janine Berg and Hannah Johnston, “Too good to be true? A comment on Hall and 
Krueger’s analysis of the labor market for Uber’s driver-partners”, Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review 72, no. 1 (2019): 59-60.
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without having to make a “trade-off” between the possibility to access 
demand through “consolidated” channels and the ability to do so via the 
new intermediaries.
In its final sections, this contribution tried to gauge some more general 
implications stemming from the application of the EU Competition Rules 
to platform-based markets: it was argued that the decisions in comment 
remain consistent with the more general approach adopted by the Court 
of Justice of the EU vis-à-vis exclusivity obligations and, in particular, 
with the notion of ‘ancillary restrain’. Consequently, it was submitted that 
closed platforms might be difficult to justify, unless the intermediary con-
fines the single-homing obligation within very restricted limits in terms of 
duration and of personal scope.
In light of the forgoing analysis, it can be concluded that as innovative 
ways of matching demand and supply of goods and services are found, 
thanks to the ubiquity of e-commerce and to the importance of platform 
intermediation, competition law is going to play a decisive role in ensuring 
that markets remain fully contestable and the development of new busi-
ness model is promoted. It is acknowledged that, as the Uber case showed, 
not all problematic issues that arise from relying on these new interme-
diation tools can be resolved by enhancing competition, and that regula-
tory responses may be necessary (for instance, when it comes to protect-
ing service providers’ labour rights). Nonetheless, it is clear that avoiding 
bottlenecks by enabling service providers to seek out customers through a 
variety of channels is going to be indispensable to foster competition based 
on quality and innovation and to ensure that demand is met efficiently.
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